How Can a $101 Million a Year CEO Help "People Get the Care They Need at an Affordable Price?"

In 2005, we entitled a post, "How Can a $124.8 Million a Year CEO Make Health Care More Affordable?"  At that time, we contrasted the enormous compensation given to the then CEO of UnitedHealth, Dr William McGuire, with the stated mission of his corporation.  Since then, we have traced the travails of UnitedHealth and its leadership.  Dr McGuire was eventually accused of receiving backdated stock options (which at one time raised his personal fortune to over $1 billion), and was pushed into retirement.  UnitedHealth was accused of a variety of management and ethical lapses.  The rather sorry story as of April, 2010 was summarized here.

The more things change, the more they stay the same.  The Minneapolis Star-Tribune just reported:

Stephen Hemsley, a serious and studious man, is known for his marathon-like work schedule, which regularly includes Saturdays and Sundays, in his role as chief executive of Minnetonka-based UnitedHealth Group.

Now, he also is known as the highest-paid CEO in Minnesota with a 2009 pay package totaling $101.96 million, six times the amount paid to the next CEO in the Star Tribune's annual survey of the state's 100 highest-paid chief executives at publicly traded companies.

But Hemsley's big pay package is also a vestige of the company's former practice of loading executive compensation heavily with stock options, a practice that changed in the wake of a crippling backdating scandal four years ago.

Those options, granted under a different regime of board directors, accounted for $98.6 million of Hemsley's income in 2009.

The attempts company officials made to minimize Hemsley's outsized compensation were almost funny:

UnitedHealth officials assert that Hemsley's 2009 pay package minus the 10-year-old options was $8.9 million, far less than the compensation paid to CEOs in other health insurance organizations.

But Hemsley did exercise the options, so he did receive the additional $98.6 million.

Hemsley also seems on target to get gargantuan compensation this year too:

Nonetheless, Hemsley has already put up good compensation numbers for 2010 with the exercising of additional options granted after 1999 worth $21 million. He also controls 6 million exercisable and unexercisable options, half of which are underwater or below the stock's current value.

The cringe-inducing contrast is with UnitedHealth's high-minded mission statement:

Our mission is to help people live healthier lives.

* We seek to enhance the performance of the health system and improve the overall health and well-being of the people we serve and their communities.
* We work with health care professionals and other key partners to expand access to quality health care so people get the care they need at an affordable price.
* We support the physician/patient relationship and empower people with the information, guidance and tools they need to make personal health choices and decisions.

Hemsley's compensation could have provided "care they need" to quite a few people at an affordable price.

More to the point, it is hard to imagine that a company that feels the need to pay so much to its CEO, and a CEO that can accept such riches, have the slightest understanding or interest in providing people "the care they need at an affordable price."

In this cynical age, I doubt many people credit the UnitedHealth mission statement with being more than advertising fluff. Nonetheless, I suspect most people believe that our society should try to provide as many people as possible with "the care they need at an affordable price," but realize that we are far from doing so. Health care insurance companies/ managed care organizations that see fit to make their hired leaders extremely rich seem to be part of the problem, not the solution.

WellPoint: Don't Know Much About Computer Programming; Aetna: Don't Know Much About Mathematics

Big US based health care insurance companies have not been covering themselves in glory in the last week.

Aetna's Math Errors

First, there was the case of Aetna's mathematical prowess, e.g., as reported by the Los Angeles Times:

A second insurance company in California has killed plans for double-digit rate hikes for individual policyholders because of errors in its filing that would have inflated premiums, state regulators said Thursday.

Connecticut-based Aetna Inc. had sought an average 19% increase in rates for its 65,000 individual customers, but pulled back after multiple math errors in its paperwork were found by its own staff and by an independent consultant working for the state.

Aetna's decision follows a similar move by Anthem Blue Cross, which canceled a rate increase of as much as 39% for many of its 800,000 California policyholders in April after the state consultant found calculation errors in its filing with the California Insurance Department.

Of course, Aetna tried to minimize the story:

An Aetna spokeswoman said the company found 'a miscalculation not previously detected' when it conducted a third round of internal reviews.

'This was a simple human error,' said spokeswoman Anjanette Coplin, who did not elaborate.

However,

'There were multiple errors … in the way [Aetna] annualized premiums and in the compounding of the rate increase,' said state Insurance Department spokesman Darrel Ng.

Of course, somehow the errors all were in Aetna's favor:

Even with the new disclosure requirements, regulators have limited authority to block rate increases. They can do so only if insurers fail to spend at least 70% of their premiums on medical claims.

In Aetna's recent rate filing, the insurer said its plan met the 70% minimum. But once the errors were identified, medical-claim spending fell below the 70% requirement. The proposed rates were higher than they should have been, officials said.

WellPoint's Computer Errors

A few minutes ago, the Associated Press reported:

WellPoint Inc. has notified 470,000 individual insurance customers that medical records, credit card numbers and other sensitive information may have been exposed in the latest security breach of the health insurer's records.

The Indianapolis company said the problem stemmed from an online program customers can use to track the progress of their application for coverage. It was fixed in March.

Spokeswoman Cynthia Sanders said an outside vendor had upgraded the insurer's application tracker last October and told the insurer all security measures were back in place.

But a California customer discovered that she could call up confidential information of other customers by manipulating Web addresses used in the program. Customers use a Web site and password to track their applications.

Note that this security breach was potentially serious:

WellPoint's security breach doesn't crack the top 10 in terms of number of people who may have had information exposed, said Paul Stephens, the [Privacy Rights Clearinghouse]organization's director of policy and advocacy. Even so, he labeled the breach 'very serious' because it possibly involved both financial and medical information.

This is not the first time WellPoint's computers and software have violated the privacy of its applicants or customers:

Two years ago, WellPoint offered free credit monitoring after it said personal information for about 128,000 customers in several states had been exposed online. In 2006, backup computer tapes containing the personal information of 200,000 of its members were stolen from a Massachusetts vendor's office.

Summary

Of course, everyone makes mistakes.  However, one would expect that at least health insurance companies/ managed care organizations ought to be able to do the math necessary to support their rate proposals correctly, and keep their policy-holders' and applicants' personal information confidential.  These would seem to be fundamental competencies that such organizations ought to display.  Of course, one can find other examples of lack the lack of competency (and worse) displayed by both Aetna and WellPoint. 

Furthermore, anyone can make mistakes, but in the real world, those who preside over such mistake-prone enterprises often do not do too well.  However, in the bizarre world of large health care organizations, the executives who preside over the ongoing bumbling just make more and more money, under the pretense that their continuing brilliant leadership just leads to one triumph after another. 

As we noted here, WellPoint CEO Angela Braly's total compensation increased in 2009 to an outsized $13.1 million, with the executives just underneath her paid proportionately well.  Per its 2010 proxy statement, WellPoint's

Total Rewards compensation program is designed to attract, engage, motivate and retain a talented team of executive officers and to appropriately reward those executive officers for their contributions to our business and our members. We seek to accomplish this goal in a way that is closely aligned with the long-term interests of our shareholders and the expectations of our members and health care providers.

I suspect that WellPoint's members' expectations did not include the three computer security breaches noted above.

Similarly, according to its 2010 proxy statement, Aetna CEO Ronald A Williams' total compensation in 2009 was a mere $18,058,162. Other top executives made proportionate amounts, from more than $1 million to more than $12 million. The rationale underlying executive compensation includes:

We seek to implement a pay-for-performance philosophy by tying a significant portion of our executives’ compensation to their achievement of financial and other goals that are linked to the Company’s business strategy and each executive’s contributions towards the achievement of those goals.

To me, avoiding mathematical errors in calculating policy premiums ought to be part of the company's goals linked to its business strategy.

An old rock song that starts with "don't know much about history," may have a certain charm.  Health insurance companies that cannot accurately calculate premiums or protect the confidentiality of policy-holders' computerized data has none. 

As long as "imperial CEOs" can continue to get extremely rich while presiding over incompetence and stupidity, if not worse (see here), we can expect the foolishness to continue.  Meanwhile, the foolishness drives up costs and drives down quality of health care for the poor suffering patients, let alone the physicians and other health care professionals who must deal with it.

To really reform health care, we need to provide incentives for competent, honest leadership, and make that leadership accountable for its shortcomings.

Edwin Lee on the Tiger We Are Now Riding

Some insights about why the leadership of large health care organizations has gone so wrong may be found on a blog I just discovered entitled "Dismounting Our Tiger," written by entrepreneur Edwin Lee. In particular, this post, triggered by the miserable results produced by BP in response to the gulf oil spill, posits the series of steps by which people become leaders of most big organizations, presumably including health care organizations:

1.They always followed orders and met the cultural expectations of their organization. They went along to get along. Early in their careers they were faced with a choice: they could make a difference or get promoted; they chose to get promoted. (Those who attempt to make a difference make waves for senior management and fellow workers who then deal with them as disloyal; troublemakers, heretics, or whistle blowers)
2.They were tapped for greatness (fast-tracked) by more senior persons early in their careers.
3.They carefully accumulated 'status' symbols like degrees, awards, medals, etc.
4.They avoided collecting demerits by taking risks and failing.

And here are the outlooks and capabilities they share:

1.They are culturally conditioned to administer their organizations as they are, not to deal with major changes either inside the organization or in the outside world. Their sole power structure comes from those who report to them and their boards of directors, who expect behavior consistent with past behavior. Should top executives initiate major changes, control of their companies becomes less certain and more difficult. (More importantly it risks their personal compensations). Leaders can’t operate in isolation, they need loyal power bases.
2.They see the world from the tribal perspective of their organizations. (Even after they go elsewhere as in the case of Larry Summers and Robert Rubin whose pro Goldman Sachs tribalism has helped to undermine real financial reform)
3.They rightly understand that relative size a marketplace is the dominant factor for survival and for growing profits. They focus almost entirely on that aspect of their business. (Much as a beautiful woman might rely solely on her beauty rather than develop her mind or personality)
4.They consider their leadership positions to be appropriate rewards for years of loyal service.
5.Their first order of business (as CEOs) is to gain control of their Boards of Directors.
6.They manipulate their Boards into paying inflated salaries, providing expensive perks, agreeing to golden parachutes and rewarding them with extravagant bonuses for last year’s performance.. (Over the last 50 years entire industries have been thus manipulated so that Boards now justify such parasitic compensation as 'competitive').

Does it all sound familiar? Does it sound like a description of many health care leaders we have discussed?

As Edwin Lee summed it up:

We, the public, are foolish for relying on these executives to plan for disasters or to care about the 'little people' either inside or outside their organizations, or to expect their boards of directors or stockholders to make essential corrections.

But in health care, we have been relying on our imperial CEOs, and woe unto us when the disasters start to occur.

RUC Off - the New England Journal Once Again Fails to Mention the Unmentionable

Last week, the influential New England Journal of Medicine published an article by Bruce Vladek entitled "Fixing Medicare's Physician Payment System."(1)  Although only identified as working for Nexara, a health consulting business, Mr Vladek was a former administrator of what was then called the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) of the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the part of the department that then ran the US Medicare program.  Vladek thus can reasonably be viewed as an expert on Medicare. 

Vladek identified two main problems with the current way physicians are paid by Medicare.  First,

Medicare is captive to an arbitrary, if elegantly conceived, formula for total payments to physicians — the sustainable growth rate (SGR). In the alternate reality of the Congressional budget process, the SGR will reduce Medicare's physician payments, which already trail those from private insurers, as far into the future as the eye can see.

Second,

there is widespread consensus that the relative fees in the current system are a significant cause of the growing imbalance in supply and utilization between primary care and specialty services in the U.S. health care system. That imbalance, in turn, is widely perceived as a major cause of both excessive costs and inadequate quality of care. This is not just a Medicare problem: the Medicare Resource-Based Relative Value Scale is used by most private insurers to set relative prices for physicians.

Vladek expanded on the second point as follows

the basic mechanics of the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule, which was supposed to change physician payment to increase rewards for primary care services at the expense of procedural and interventional services, appears to have gone totally off track. For various reasons, the fee schedule, which originally did increase the prices of evaluation and management services relative to those of surgery or invasive procedures, turned in the other direction through the process of annual updating of relative value units. Surgeons, radiologists, and some medical specialists are now paid two to three times as much per hour as providers of cognitive services, which is about where we began 20 years ago; this was the situation that the fee schedule was supposed to fix.

The question of the relative virtues of primary versus specialty care can be debated ad nauseam, but in other wealthy countries that serve their populations at least as well as we do, the ratio of primary care physicians to specialists is much higher than in the United States, and the gap in compensation is much smaller or the poles even reversed. Young physicians, burdened by increasing educational debts, may well choose a career path on the basis of a major difference in compensation, especially when the better-compensated positions require less ongoing responsibility for patients and offer better working hours.

This is about all that Vladek wrote about how the imbalance between how Medicare pays for primary care and other "cognitive services," and for procedures came about. Vladek, and many others have argued that this imbalance has lead to strong financial incentives that have been slowly destroying primary care, and strong incentives that have lead to the use of too many procedures, both strong drivers of rising costs in the most expensive health care system in the world.

Vladek noted vaguely that "through various reasons," the incentives were imbalanced by "the process of annual updating of relative value units."

However, as we have discussed in several blog posts, a lot more is known about how this process got "totally off track."

In fact, in 2007, an article by Bodenheimer et al in the Annals of Internal Medicine explained the problems in considerably more detail.(2)  As we wrote then, Its main points included

• Proceduralists are often able to learn how to do their procedures more quickly, and thus increase the volume of procedures done, while office and hospital visits can only be sped up so much.
• The process used to update the RBRVS system is biased towards procedures for three main reasons: 1. "specialty society influence in proposing RVU [relative value unit] increases," 2. the specialist-heavy RUC [Relative Value Scale Update Committee] membership," and 3. "the desire of RUC specialists to avoid increases in evaluation and management [that is, cognitive, or non-procedural] RVUs."
• Medicare now uses a formula to limit increases in overall spending. The use of this formula leads to across the board cuts in all reimbursements. Since cognitive services reimbursements were never high to begin with, and have rarely been individually increased, these cuts tend to have disproportionate decreases.
• Private insurers and managed care organizations tend to follow Medicare's lead in their reimbursement procedures, but tend to tilt the playing field even more in favor of procedures versus cognitive services. Several studies showed that such payers paid more for procedures than did Medicare, but about the same for office and hospital visits.

The role of the RBRVS Update Committee (RUC) is complex and in many ways mysterious.  As we wrote before, to update the system, the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) relies almost exclusively on the advice of the RBRVS Update Committee. The RUC is a private committee of the AMA, touted as an "expert panel" that takes advantage of the organization's First Amendment rights to petition the government. Membership on the RUC is allotted to represent specialty societies, so that the vast majority of the members represent specialties that do procedures and focus on expensive, high-technology tests and treatments. However, the identities of RUC members are opaque, and the proceedings of the group are secret.

To expand on the penultimate point, the current page on the AMA web-site that describes the RUC only lists its members in terms of their specialties and organizational affiliation.  Their names do not appear.  A response to a previous post by me on the subject by the then Chair and Chair-Elect of the RUC suggested that the RUC membership is not quite secret. They stated that "a list of the individual members of the RUC is published in the AMA publication, Medicare RBRVS 2009: The Physicians Guide." This publication is available from the AMA here for a mere $71.95. However, the book is not on the web, or in my local or university library, and I have no other way to easily access it.  Thus, the RUC membership as at best relatively opaque.

To expand on the ultimate point, as Goodson(3) noted, RUC "meetings are closed to outside observers except by invitation of the chair." Furthermore, he stated, "proceedings are proprietary and therefore not publicly available for review."

The fog surrounding the operations of the RUC seems to have affected many who write about.  We have posted (here, here, and here) about how previous publications about problems with incentives provided to physicians seemed to have avoided even mentioning the RUC.  In 2010, post the US recent attempt at health care reform, the RUC seems to remain the great unmentionable.  Even the leading US medical journal seems reluctant to even print its name. 

Thus, as we noted before, however, the mysteries about it remain:

• How did the government come to fix the payments physicians receive? Government price-fixing has not been popular in the US, yet this has caused no outcry.
• Why is the process by which they are fixed allowed to be so opaque and unaccountable? Why are there no public hearings on the updates, and why is there no input from practicing physicians or organizations other than those related to the RUC?
• How did the RUC become de facto in charge of this process?
• Why does the AMA keep the membership on the RUC so opaque, and give no input into the RUC process to its general membership?
• Why is the RUC membership so dominated by procedural specialists? Why were primary care physicians, who made up at least a sizable minority of physicians when the update process was started, not represented according to their numbers?
• Why has there been so little discussion of the RUC and its responsibility for an extremely expensive health care system dominated by high-technology, expensive, risky and invasive procedures?

Without discussing how the incentives for physicians became so unbalanced, do we really expect we can fix them?  In this case, the persistence of the anechoic effect seems to be doing real damage to the discussion of the critical issues we in the US face today.
References


1. Vladek B. Fixing Medicare's physician payment system. N Engl J Med 2010; 362:1955-1957. (Link here.)
2. Bodenheimer T, Berenson RA, Rudolf P. The primary care-specialty income gap: why it matters. Ann Intern Med 2007; 146: 301-306. (Link here.)
3. Goodson JD. Unintended consequences of Resource-Based Relative Value Scale reimbursement. JAMA 2007; 298(19):2308-2310.  (Link here.)

Pay for Hypocrisy for Health Insurance Executives

A few weeks ago, we discussed the cognitive dissonance produced by huge salary boosts for top executives of health care companies with miserable ethical track records.  One of our examples contrasted a long list of ethical violations by US giant health insurance company/ managed care organization WellPoint and the huge raises given its CEO and top executives.  Now more ethical questions are being raised about WellPoint.

Rate Hikes Retrospectively for Golden Parachutes

An op-ed published in several California newspapers (here via the Sonoma Index-Tribune) claimed that the huge rate hike that WellPoint's California subsidiary proposed earlier this year, an action that helped to revitalize the US legislative health care reform process, was meant to recoup costs of a previous merger that the company had agreed not impose on its policy-holders:

Nobody at Anthem Blue Cross, the firm that's now a poster boy for out-of-control health insurance premiums, likes remembering the company's days of high anxiety back in 2004, when California's then-Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi was holding up its $18 billion deal to take over Thousand Oaks-based WellPoint and its California Blue Cross subsidiary.

A frequent resister of insurance rate increases, he at least wanted to make sure Anthem didn't pass along the inflated price it paid for WellPoint to Blue Cross customers.

So he refused for months to sign off on the merger, a form of passive resistance that threatened to hold up the entire deal, which also involved WellPoint insurance subsidiaries in other states.

...in the process, he achieved some things for California consumers: Anthem formally agreed to forego any rate increases for Blue Cross customers to cover the costs of the merger, which increased more than $2 billion during the delay as WellPoint shares rose from $91 to $113 between the day the deal was announced and the day it went through. The company also promised to invest $200 million over 10 years in under-served communities through California's Healthy Families program, plus another $15 million on children's insurance programs and $50 million for training nurses and operating clinics in California.

It wasn't as good as keeping California Blue Cross a California company, but at least it was something.

'Was' now appears likely to be the operative word, because there is no way the cost of medical tests, doctor and hospital fees and medical supplies has risen 39 percent in one year, a claim made by Anthem executives while testifying before Congress and state legislative committees.

Nope, it's now clear that, even if Anthem doesn't admit it, a good part of its rate increase would go to replenish corporate cash spent on the WellPoint takeover.

It's been just over five years since that deal was completed, with Anthem adopting the WellPoint name for its parent company, much as North Carolina-based NationsBank renamed itself Bank of America after taking over the B of A. The Anthem tag was then hung on California Blue Cross.

That's enough time so the corporation can conveniently maintain it has lived up to its written commitment not to make customers pay for its high-priced acquisition - while in reality making them do just that.

For certain, the huge price increases Anthem may now assess violate the spirit of its agreement with Garamendi, even if they might not violate the letter of that deal.

Note that this article did not make explicit what  "costs of the merger" Mr Garamendi did not want policy-holders to pay for.  As contemporaneous coverage of the negotiations by USAToday made clear, these included golden parachutes for some of the executives involved.

Commissioner John Garamendi was the last major stumbling block to the $16.4 billion deal, delaying the merger of a piece of the company, Blue Cross Life & Health, over which he had jurisdiction. His main concerns were costs to policyholders and the size of executives' golden parachutes, estimated at $200 million to $600 million.

WellPoint CEO Leonard Schaeffer alone is expected to get a package worth $53.5 million in cash, stock options and pension payments when the deal is completed.

Now, of course, it appears that the policy-holders are being called upon to retrospectively reimburse the company for the outrageous amounts it gave to executives back then, who may turn out to have been the biggest beneficiaries of the merger.

Turning Administrative into Patient Care Costs

Then, an article in the Washington Post reported how WellPoint was reclassifying administrative costs as patient care costs to fulfill an upcoming requiement of health care reform to spend at least 80 percent of premiums on health care.

The idea was simple enough: Make sure that health insurers spend the vast majority of their revenue on patient care, instead of using it for things such as advertising, profits and executive pay.

To that end, the new health-care law says an insurer must give money back to consumers if it devotes less than 80 percent of premiums to paying medical claims and improving care. For insurers serving large groups, the target is 85 percent.

But even before the health-care overhaul was signed into law last month, one of the nation's largest insurance companies reclassified certain expenses in a way that increased its so-called medical-loss ratio. In January, WellPoint began including under medical benefits such costs as nurse hotlines, 'medical management,' and 'clinical health policy,' a WellPoint executive said in a March briefing for investors.

To be clear, while it may be that "nurse hotlines" actually involve care for patients, it is hard to fathom what "medical management" by an insurance company means.  Certainly, "clinical health policy" is not direct patient care.

Targeting Breast Cancer Patients for Insurance Policy Cancellation

At least the above two cases were only about money. The third case affects patient care.

A Reuters report showed how WellPoint deliberately targeted every patient who developed breast cancer for a fraud investigation, often resulting in findings of minor irregularities in insurance applications that the company used as pretexts to retroactively cancel the patients' policies. Many of these patients then could not get needed cancer care.

...WellPoint was using a computer algorithm that automatically targeted them and every other policyholder recently diagnosed with breast cancer. The software triggered an immediate fraud investigation, as the company searched for some pretext to drop their policies, according to government regulators and investigators.

Once the women were singled out, they say, the insurer then canceled their policies based on either erroneous or flimsy information. WellPoint declined to comment on the women's specific cases without a signed waiver from them, citing privacy laws.

That tens of thousands of Americans lost their health insurance shortly after being diagnosed with life-threatening, expensive medical conditions has been well documented by law enforcement agencies, state regulators and a congressional committee. Insurance companies have used the practice, known as 'rescission,' for years. And a congressional committee last year said WellPoint was one of the worst offenders.

But WellPoint also has specifically targeted women with breast cancer for aggressive investigation with the intent to cancel their policies, federal investigators told Reuters.

Not only did this seem heartless and unethical, it demonstrated the hypocrisy of WellPoint's leadership.

The revelation is especially striking for a company whose CEO and president, Angela Braly, has earned plaudits for how her company improved the medical care and treatment of other policyholders with breast cancer.

Specifically,

Singling out women with breast cancer for aggressive investigation with the intent of canceling their insurance stands in stark contrast not only to the public image WellPoint cultivates for itself but also to the good work it does for many other policyholders with breast cancer.

WellPoint CEO Braly has taken a strong personal interest in women's health issues. Foremost among them is how to increase services to people with breast cancer.

The company prides itself on being one of the United States' largest corporations with women at the helm. Besides Braly, two high-powered, politically connected women sit on WellPoint's board: Susan Bayh, the wife of retiring Democratic Sen. Evan Bayh of Indiana, and Sheila Burke, who was chief of staff to former Senate Republican leader Bob Dole.

On Braly's initiative, WellPoint has funded groundbreaking studies about the disparities in quality of health care to minority women -- including women with breast cancer.

WellPoint has worked to encourage mammography for at-risk women. Personalized letters -- followed up by phone calls -- are sent to more than 80,000 women between the ages of 52 and 69 if they have not had a mammogram in the past year. The company conducts automated calls for women ages 40 to 69 to make sure they are getting mammograms.

Once diagnosed, WellPoint has set up an 'Breast Cancer Resource Center' for its policyholders to help them 'navigate the complex health care system.'

And in May 2009, WellPoint's charitable foundation, the WellPoint Foundation LLC, provided a grant for the American Cancer Society for its 'Hope Lodges,' which allow cancer patients and family members free lodging and support while receiving care far from home.

The only explanation provided in the article for this behavior was that politically correct concerns about womens' health issues only go so far, money is more important.

Why would WellPoint on the one hand work to improve health care for women with breast cancer while automatically investigating every single woman diagnosed with breast cancer for possible cancellation of their policies?

Karen L. Pollitz, a research professor at the Health Policy Institute at Georgetown University, offers one possible explanation: 'It is important for these companies' profit margins that they get rid of policyholders with expensive diseases,' she said.

I would add also that these profit margins provide the excuses for baronial compensation for the company's top executives. 

Parenthetically, the article also noted that WellPoint had lobbied against provisions in the health care reform bill that might have threatened its ability to retrospectively cancel insurance policies after their holders got sick:

Many critics worry the new law will not lead to an end of these practices. Some state and federal regulators -- as well as investigators, congressional staffers and academic experts -- say the health care legislation lacks teeth, at least in terms of enforcement or regulatory powers to either stop or even substantially reduce rescission.

'People have this idea that someone is going to flip a switch and rescission and other bad insurance practices are going to end,' says Peter Harbage, a former health care adviser to the Clinton administration. 'Insurers will find ways to undermine the protections in the new law, just as they did with the old law. Enforcement is the key.'

During the recent legislative process for the reform law, however, lobbyists for WellPoint and other top insurance companies successfully fought proposed provisions of the legislation. In particular, they complained about rules that would have made it more difficult for the companies to fairly -- or unfairly -- cancel policyholders.

For example, an early version of the health care bill passed by the House of Representatives would have created a Federal Office of Health Insurance Oversight to monitor and regulate insurance practices like rescission. WellPoint lobbyists pressed for the proposed agency to not be included in the final bill signed into law by the president.

They also helped quash proposed provisions that would have required a third party review of its or any other insurance company's decision to cancel a customer's policy.

Furthermore, an article on the Huffington Post noted that a former WellPoint executive seems to have written a good part of the health care reform legislation:

As Marcy Wheeler reported last year, the Senate Finance Committee bill was written by former WellPoint VP Liz Fowler, who left her position at the insurance company in February 2009 expressly for the purpose of helping the committee to draft the health care bill.

And when Max Baucus did a 'victory lap' after the health care bil passed, he expressly thanked Fowler for her work:

'I wish to single out one person, and that one person is sitting next to me. Her name is Liz Fowler. Liz Fowler is my chief health counsel. Liz Fowler has put my health care team together. Liz Fowler worked for me many years ago, left for the private sector, and then came back when she realized she could be there at the creation of health care reform because she wanted that to be, in a certain sense, her profession lifetime goal. She put together the White Paper last November-2008-the 87-page document which became the basis, the foundation, the blueprint from which almost all health care measures in all bills on both sides of the aisle came.'

Summary

To make this more personal than these posts usually are, I wonder how WellPoint CEO Angela Braly sleeps in whatever luxurious accomodations her eight-figure compensation affords her?  I wonder how all the other current and former WellPoint leaders who styled themselves great proponents of "womens' health issues" can live with putting profits ahead of the care of breast cancer patients?

Adding this latest list of ethical offenses to those we discussed earlier, WellPoint is beating out the heavy corporate competition as an example of the hypocrisy produced by putting imperial CEOs and their trusty hench-people ahead of every other consideration.  It has also become a premier example of how self-interested leadership can raise costs, decrease access, and degrade clinical care.  It further shows how compensating health care leaders to the point where they become imperial also grants them the power to fend off most threats to their power.  (Consider what health care reform might have become if it were orchestrated by people really interested in improving care, controlling costs, and increasing access, rather than by imperial CEOs who just wanted to become more imperial.) 

If we truly want health care that is accessible, of high quality, at a fair price, and more importantly, if we want health care that is honest and focused on patients, we need to provide health care leaders with clear, rational incentives in these directions, and make them fully accountable for their actions, and the courses of their organizations under their leadership.

What Me Worry, Redux - Another Leader Prospers Despite Questions about His Organization's Ethics and Performance

We have posted lately (here and here) about how leaders of health care organizations seem to be getting even richer despite questions about their organizations' ethics or performance.  Here we go again. 

The news about UnitedHealth over the years has provided plenty of examples of organizational behavior that did not fit the company's stated lofty goals, per its "Social Responsibility" page:

UnitedHealth Group's mission is to help people live healthier lives.

Social responsibility begins with us–and how we do business. Every day, our 75,000 employees strive to find smart ways to promote healthier lives in our communities.

On its "Mission and Values" page:

Our mission is to help people live healthier lives.

* We seek to enhance the performance of the health system and improve the overall health and well-being of the people we serve and their communities.
* We work with health care professionals and other key partners to expand access to quality health care so people get the care they need at an affordable price.
* We support the physician/patient relationship and empower people with the information, guidance and tools they need to make personal health choices and decisions.

However, a few years ago, we posted repeatedly about a block-buster scandal that lead to the ouster of the UnitedHealth CEO, Dr William McGuire. As we discussed, (here, here, and here from 2006 with links backward) Dr McGuire received outrageously lavish remuneration, which stood in stark contrast to the previous UHG mission's pledge to "make health care more affordable."  Controversy has swirled over the timing of huge stock option grants given to Dr McGuire (see post here), leading to his resignation in October, 2006 (see post here). Later, McGuire agreed to pay back some of those options, although that reportedly still left him with more than $800 million worth of options (see post here).  Iin 2009, we posted about the final settlement of the back-dating scandal, which cost UnitedHealth $895 million, and Dr McGuire $30 million and the cancellation of 3.6 million stock options. 

Also,

• as reported by the Hartford Courant, "UnitedHealth Group Inc., the largest U.S. health insurer, will refund $50 million to small businesses that New York state officials said were overcharged in 2006."
• UnitedHalth promised its investors it would continue to raise premiums, even if that priced increasing numbers of people out of its policies (see post here);
• UnitedHealth's acquisition of Pacificare in California allegedly lead to a "meltdown" of its claims paying mechanisms (see post here);
• UnitedHealth's acquisition of Sierra Health Services allegedly gave it a monopoly in Utah, while the company allegedly was transferring much of its revenue out of the state of Rhode Island, rather than using it to pay claims (see post here)
• UnitedHealth frequently violated Nebraska insurance laws (see post here);
• UnitedHealth settled charges that its Ingenix subsidiaries manipulation of data lead to underpaying patients who received out-of-network care (see post here).

However, it being proxy season, the Washington Post just reported current UnitedHealth CEO Stephen J Helmsley's compensation,

$8.9 million, up from $3.2 million in 2008. The 2009 total included a salary of $1.3 million, which was unchanged from the previous year, and a cash bonus of $2 million, up from $1.8 million the year before. It also included $5.6 million attributed to stock-related awards.

But that was not the only money Mr Helmsley reaped from his job at UnitedHealth:

The chief executive of UnitedHealth Group, one of the nation's largest health insurers, reaped almost $100 million from exercising stock options last year, the company reported Thursday.

Stephen J. Hemsley exercised 4.9 million options in February 2009 at a gain of $98.6 million, the company said in a regulatory filing. The options were awarded almost a decade earlier.

$98.6 million here, $98.6 million there, and soon you have some real money. How did the UnitedHealth board rationalize making Mr Helmsely such a wealthy man?

The compensation committee of UnitedHealth's board believed that Hemsley's 2009 compensation package 'was appropriate to recognize Mr. Hemsley's overall leadership in positioning the Company for long-term success in a very difficult overall economic environment,' UnitedHealth said in the report filed with the SEC Thursday.

The committee credited Hemsley with 'enhancing the Company's reputation, ethical culture and tone at the top.'

'Although Mr. Hemsley's total compensation is below the median as compared to other CEOs in the Company's peer groups, the Compensation Committee and Mr. Hemsley agree that it is sufficient to motivate and retain him,' the company reported.

Note first that some of the issues listed above (after the back-dated options scandal) accruef on Mr Helmsley's watch as CEO, which began in 2006.   They did not enhance the company's reputation, or seem to be evidence of an enhanced "ethical culture and tone." 

The rationale to have given Mr Helmsley so many stock options in 1999 as to give him a nearly $100 million dollar profit in 2009 was not stated.

Moreover, as noted in the 2010 proxy statement,

Mr Helmsley is President and Chief Executive Officer of UnitedHealth Group and has served in that capacity since November 2006. he has been a member of the Board of Directors since February 2000. Mr Helmsley joined the Company in 1997 as Senior Executive Vice President. He became Chief Operating Officer in 1998, was named President in 1999, and served as President and Chief Operating Officer from 1999 to November 2006.

So it was on Mr Helmsley's watch as Chief Operating Officer that all of the events and issues listed above occurred. Tell me again about that "enhanced ethical culture?"

So I say it again. Clearly we see examples of both profoundly perverse incentives and a complete lack of accountability and responsibility affecting the leadership of major health care organizations. Is it any wonder that these organizations continue to act unethically, and that the costs of the goods and services they provide rise continuously?

If we truly want health care that is accessible, of high quality, at a fair price, and more importantly, if we want health care that is honest and focused on patients, we need to provide health care leaders with clear, rational incentives in these directions, and make them fully accountable for their actions, and the courses of their organizations under their leadership.

What Me Worry? - Leaders Prosper Despite Questions About Their Organizations' Ethics and Performance

There were two examples in the recent news about how the leaders of health care organizations seem to prosper no matter what questions are raised about their organizations' ethics or performance.

WellPoint

It seemed that anger over a rate increase by a subsidiary of the huge insurance company/ managed care organization WellPoint was one reason for the revival of efforts in the US to enact some sort of health care reform legislation.  In our comment on this controversy, we noted that questions about the ethics of WellPoint's actions have appeared again and again.  Wellpoint...

• settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see post here).
• subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see story here).
• California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post here).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post here).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post here).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post here). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post here).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post here).
• California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contract (see post here).
• formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post here).
• announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post here).
• was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see post here).
• settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (builty by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see post here). 
• violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, according to the California health insurance commissioner (see post here).

But a few days ago, according to the Indianapolis Star:

Large stock awards helped boost total compensation to top executives at WellPoint by 51 percent to 75 percent last year over 2008.

The big jumps in take-home pay are detailed in the Indianapolis health insurer's annual proxy report to shareholders filed Friday.

Angela Braly, who is chair of the board, president and chief executive, saw her 2009 total compensation rise 51 percent, to $13.1 million. That compares with $8.67 million in 2008 and $14.8 million in 2007.

Braly's salary of $1.14 million barely budged from 2008, but she earned a $6.2 million stock award, almost triple the award she got in 2008.

Total compensation to other top executives:

Wayne DeVeydt, chief financial officer, $7.25 million, up 75 percent from 2008.

Ken Goulet, executive vice president, $4.43 million, up 62 percent.

Dijuana Lewis, executive vice president, $4.46 million, up 64.5 percent.

So whatever top WellPoint executives are paid for, it is not insuring that the company avoids ethical questions about its conduct, or controls health care costs or mdoerates premiums, for that matter. 

Boston Scientific, and Zimmer Holdings

We just commented on the generous compensation given the new and former CEOs of Boston Scientific, despite a series of ethical questions about that company's conduct, culminating in a guilty plea by the company to charges that it concealed information about important and potentially dangerous defects in its products.

A few days ago, I found a reminder, buried in an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune about a dispute between Boston Scientific and St Jude Medical, that current Boston Scientific CEO Ray Elliott has a track record of collecting generous compensation despite ethical questions about the companies he has lead.

Elliott is certainly familiar with the potential ethical minefield surrounding the relationships between sales reps and doctors. He was CEO at orthopedic devicemaker Zimmer Holdings Inc., which paid (along with four other companies) $311 million in 2007 to settle a Department of Justice investigation into the consulting fees paid to doctors.

As we discussed back in 2007, Zimmer Holdings Inc was one of four medical device companies which submitted to deferred prosecution agreements in response to charges that the companies implemented criminal conspiracies to violate federal anti-kickback laws. We posted several times about one aspect of this settlement, the mandate that the companies make public the payments (often huge) to orthopedic surgeons, academic institutions, and medical associations. (See posts here, here, here, here, here.) At the time, I did not think to look into what happened to the leadership of these companies thereafter.

According to the 2008 proxy statement by Zimmer Holdings, Ray Elliott conveniently retired in 2007, just before the deferred prosecution agreement was announced. Since he had been President of Zimmer since 1997 and CEO since 2001, according to the 2007 proxy statement, he appeared to have been in the top leadership of the corporation during the time the actions were performed that resulted in the deferred prosecution agreement. Nonetheless, again according to the 2008 statement, for the part of 2007 during which he served as CEO, his total compensation was $7,987,158. For 2006, his total compensation was $11,998,121. In 2007, the present value of his two pension plans were $269,764 and $5,302,050. In 2007, he owned 1,235,859 shares of stock (now worth $72,952,757 at the current price of $59.03 /share), and had the right to acquire 1,169,987 more within 60 days.

And of course, as we posted earlier, Boston Scientific paid him over $30 million for working part of 2009.

So Mr Elliott prospered mightily from his leadership of ethically challenged Zimmer Holdings, and was then further rewarded by ethically challenged Boston Scientific.

Summary

We have commented again and again that while numerous health care organizations have been charged with unethical, and sometimes illegal behavior, the people who oversaw, directed, or implemented the behavior almost never have had to suffer any negative consequences.  Now we see that while some large health care organizations have been subject to penalties for unethical and illegal behavior, the leaders of these organizations have been compensated so well as to make them rich, rich beyond the dreams of most people.  So the problem is not merely that captaining an organization onto the ethical rocks costs one nothing, but that it can make one very rich.

Clearly we see examples of both profoundly perverse incentives and a complete lack of accountability and responsibility affecting the leadership of major health care organizations.  Is it any wonder that these organizations continue to act unethically, and that the costs of the goods and services they provide rise continuously?

If we truly want health care that is accessible, of high quality, at a fair price, and more importantly, if we want health care that is honest and focused on patients, we need to provide health care leaders with clear, rational incentives in these directions, and make them fully accountable for their actions, and the courses of their organizations under their leadership.

What Me Worry? - Leaders Prosper Despite Questions About Their Organizations' Ethics and Performance

There were two examples in the recent news about how the leaders of health care organizations seem to prosper no matter what questions are raised about their organizations' ethics or performance.

WellPoint

It seemed that anger over a rate increase by a subsidiary of the huge insurance company/ managed care organization WellPoint was one reason for the revival of efforts in the US to enact some sort of health care reform legislation.  In our comment on this controversy, we noted that questions about the ethics of WellPoint's actions have appeared again and again.  Wellpoint...

• settled a RICO (racketeer influenced corrupt organization) law-suit in California over its alleged systematic attempts to withhold payments from physicians (see post here).
• subsidiary New York Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield misplaced a computer disc containing confidential information on 75,000 policy-holders (see story here).
• California Anthem Blue Cross subsidiary cancelled individual insurance policies after their owners made large claims (a practices sometimes called rescission).  The company was ordered to pay a million dollar fine in early 2007 for this (see post here).  A state agency charged that some of these cancellations by another WellPoint subsidiary were improper (see post here).  WellPoint was alleged to have pushed physicians to look for patients' medical problems that would allow rescission (see post here).  It turned out that California never collected the 2007 fine noted above, allegedly because the state agency feared that WellPoint had become too powerful to take on (see post here). But in 2008, WellPoint agreed to pay more fines for its rescission practices (see post here).  In 2009, WellPoint executives were defiant about their continued intention to make rescission in hearings before the US congress (see post here).
• California Blue Cross subsidiary allegedly attempted to get physicians to sign contracts whose confidentiality provisions would have prevented them from consulting lawyers about the contract (see post here).
• formerly acclaimed CFO was fired for unclear reasons, and then allegations from numerous women of what now might be called Tiger Woods-like activities surfaced (see post here).
• announced that its investment portfolio was hardly immune from the losses prevalent in late 2008 (see post here).
• was sanctioned by the US government in early 2009 for erroneously denying coverage to senior patients who subscribed to its Medicare drug plans (see post here).
• settled charges that it had used a questionable data-base (builty by Ingenix, a subsidiary of ostensible WellPoint competitor UnitedHealth) to determine fees paid to physicians for out-of-network care (see post here). 
• violated state law more than 700 times over a three-year period by failing to pay medical claims on time and misrepresenting policy provisions to customers, according to the California health insurance commissioner (see post here).

But a few days ago, according to the Indianapolis Star:

Large stock awards helped boost total compensation to top executives at WellPoint by 51 percent to 75 percent last year over 2008.

The big jumps in take-home pay are detailed in the Indianapolis health insurer's annual proxy report to shareholders filed Friday.

Angela Braly, who is chair of the board, president and chief executive, saw her 2009 total compensation rise 51 percent, to $13.1 million. That compares with $8.67 million in 2008 and $14.8 million in 2007.

Braly's salary of $1.14 million barely budged from 2008, but she earned a $6.2 million stock award, almost triple the award she got in 2008.

Total compensation to other top executives:

Wayne DeVeydt, chief financial officer, $7.25 million, up 75 percent from 2008.

Ken Goulet, executive vice president, $4.43 million, up 62 percent.

Dijuana Lewis, executive vice president, $4.46 million, up 64.5 percent.

So whatever top WellPoint executives are paid for, it is not insuring that the company avoids ethical questions about its conduct, or controls health care costs or mdoerates premiums, for that matter. 

Boston Scientific, and Zimmer Holdings

We just commented on the generous compensation given the new and former CEOs of Boston Scientific, despite a series of ethical questions about that company's conduct, culminating in a guilty plea by the company to charges that it concealed information about important and potentially dangerous defects in its products.

A few days ago, I found a reminder, buried in an article in the Minneapolis Star-Tribune about a dispute between Boston Scientific and St Jude Medical, that current Boston Scientific CEO Ray Elliott has a track record of collecting generous compensation despite ethical questions about the companies he has lead.

Elliott is certainly familiar with the potential ethical minefield surrounding the relationships between sales reps and doctors. He was CEO at orthopedic devicemaker Zimmer Holdings Inc., which paid (along with four other companies) $311 million in 2007 to settle a Department of Justice investigation into the consulting fees paid to doctors.

As we discussed back in 2007, Zimmer Holdings Inc was one of four medical device companies which submitted to deferred prosecution agreements in response to charges that the companies implemented criminal conspiracies to violate federal anti-kickback laws. We posted several times about one aspect of this settlement, the mandate that the companies make public the payments (often huge) to orthopedic surgeons, academic institutions, and medical associations. (See posts here, here, here, here, here.) At the time, I did not think to look into what happened to the leadership of these companies thereafter.

According to the 2008 proxy statement by Zimmer Holdings, Ray Elliott conveniently retired in 2007, just before the deferred prosecution agreement was announced. Since he had been President of Zimmer since 1997 and CEO since 2001, according to the 2007 proxy statement, he appeared to have been in the top leadership of the corporation during the time the actions were performed that resulted in the deferred prosecution agreement. Nonetheless, again according to the 2008 statement, for the part of 2007 during which he served as CEO, his total compensation was $7,987,158. For 2006, his total compensation was $11,998,121. In 2007, the present value of his two pension plans were $269,764 and $5,302,050. In 2007, he owned 1,235,859 shares of stock (now worth $72,952,757 at the current price of $59.03 /share), and had the right to acquire 1,169,987 more within 60 days.

And of course, as we posted earlier, Boston Scientific paid him over $30 million for working part of 2009.

So Mr Elliott prospered mightily from his leadership of ethically challenged Zimmer Holdings, and was then further rewarded by ethically challenged Boston Scientific.

Summary

We have commented again and again that while numerous health care organizations have been charged with unethical, and sometimes illegal behavior, the people who oversaw, directed, or implemented the behavior almost never have had to suffer any negative consequences.  Now we see that while some large health care organizations have been subject to penalties for unethical and illegal behavior, the leaders of these organizations have been compensated so well as to make them rich, rich beyond the dreams of most people.  So the problem is not merely that captaining an organization onto the ethical rocks costs one nothing, but that it can make one very rich.

Clearly we see examples of both profoundly perverse incentives and a complete lack of accountability and responsibility affecting the leadership of major health care organizations.  Is it any wonder that these organizations continue to act unethically, and that the costs of the goods and services they provide rise continuously?

If we truly want health care that is accessible, of high quality, at a fair price, and more importantly, if we want health care that is honest and focused on patients, we need to provide health care leaders with clear, rational incentives in these directions, and make them fully accountable for their actions, and the courses of their organizations under their leadership.

More Doubts About Private Equity Taking Over Not-for-Profit Hospital Systems

Last week, we posted about how buy-outs of not-for-profit hospital systems by private equity firms seemed to be a new fashion in health care.  Since then, new doubts have been raised about whether this is a good idea.

Detroit Medical Center, Vanguard Health, and the Blackstone Group

Letters to the Detroit Free Press raised concerns,

As a nonprofit corporation, DMC's mission is to provide quality health care to the community. Management is accountable to Detroit area citizens and health care consumers, not to profit-motivated investors.

As a private, for-profit corporation, its mission will be to provide profit for its shareholders. Management will be accountable to shareholders and will be rewarded in relation to the rate of return on their investments.

Also, the Free Press reported that a coalition of local not-for-profit organizations challenged the legality of the proposed sale,

The sale of the Detroit Medical Center to a for-profit Nashville company violates state law and raises issues about whether poor patients who depend on the DMC will be assured of care for years to come, three nonprofit Michigan organizations said today.

Marjorie Mitchell, executive director of Michigan Universal Health Care Network, said the organizations e-mailed today a three-page list of concerns about the sale to Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox.

Mitchell testified briefly today at the Detroit City Council about the issue and distributed the letter. The two other nonprofit organizations signing the letter were Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength, or Moses, an organization of community and religious leaders active on health issues, and Michigan Legal Services, a Detroit legal aid organization. The three groups called themselves the Coalition to Protect Detroit Health Care.

Citing a provision in state law, the letter said Michigan law is clear that nonprofit companies should not 'permit assets … to be used, conveyed or distributed for non-charitable purposes.'

'The mission of a for-profit is to serve the stockholders,' the letter to Cox said. The letter said it is the opinion of the three groups that the purchase by Vanguard of the DMC 'violates Michigan’s nonprofit corporation statute.'

The three organizations asked Cox to hold public meetings to answer questions about the impact of the proposed sale on the health of Detroiters, particularly uninsured people.

The groups also have questions about how the DMC’s $140-million charitable assets will be used as well as concerns that use of state Renaissance Zone money would benefit a for-profit company.

Caritas Christi Health Care and Cerberus Capital Management

Boston Globe news articles noted that Cerberus failed recently not only in its management of Chrysler, but of GMAC (now also bailed out by the US government), its management is secretive even for the opaque world of private equity, and it has no experience running "large medical systems." 
 
A letter by Dr Arnold Relman, distinguished former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, warned,

Cerberus promises to keep the present hospital management, add much money beyond the purchase price toward the operation and improvement of the hospitals, maintain charity support, and not sell the system — for three years. After that, who knows? Cerberus follows its own interests, and it will take money out of the community, not contribute to it.

As a close observer of the for-profit hospital industry ever since its beginnings, I predict that Cerberus will sell to another business sooner or later, and the initial promises will be forgotten. That’s what happened at Framingham’s MetroWest Hospital.

Control over the kinds of medical services provided by the hospital would be lost. Unprofitable services such as pediatrics, obstetrics, and outpatient psychiatry would disappear. Business-owned hospitals will resist major reforms to control medical costs or reorganize a community’s medical services in the public interest.

Caritas Christi ran an advertisement in local papers that referred to Cerberus as its new "financial sponsor," suggesting that the company was going to give a still not-for-profit health care system a grant, quite different from what was really proposed, which was that Cerberus would become the owner of a formerly not for-profit health care system, thus rendering it into a privately held, for-profit system.  One wonders why the public relations people thought they needed to spin the deal thus.

Finally, the Boston Globe profiled current Caritas Christi CEO Dr Ralph de la Torre, who apparently negotiated a deal that would leave him "as chief executive of Caritas, while also putting him in charge of acquiring other hospitals for Cerberus." But the article raised questions about what sort of leader he would be. It characterized him as transformed "from doctor to dealmaker," who now "stands to win a much bigger payout." Worse, it suggested that winning, as evidenced by making more money than anyone else, rather than access to quality patient care, is his prime motivation.

He used to say, ‘It’s not about the money, but that’s one way people keep score.’

In addition, Dr De la Torre has now so transformed into a CEO that "he let his medical license lapse."

Summary

Let me note some people think that the notion that how much money one makes should be considered a "score," and that he who dies with the most money wins, was one of the central reasons for the global financial collapse. For example, Nancy Rapoport suggested some New Year's resolutions for corporate boards (in 2008!), including:

I will remind myself and my colleagues that the level of CEO compensation is not an indicator of the company’s performance and that the arms race towards excessively high executive compensation is not a winnable race. At the point when money becomes just a way of keeping score, compensation is probably too high.

Earlier in 2007, Michael Kinsley wrote presciently in Time about,

a development in the larger economy. For most people, the point of money is that you can buy things with it. But at the top, where people already can buy whatever they want, the purpose of money is keeping score: making sure that you don't slip down in the Forbes 400 list.

So, putting someone who believes that he must always make more money in order to keep "winning" in charge of a large health care system does not seem to be a recipe for better patient care or more access, but rather for ever-increasing executive compensation while making money becomes the overwhelming priority for the organization, completely eclipsing such quaint concepts as quality of care, reasonable costs, or adequate access.

Recent history has not shown that for-profit hospitals deliver cheaper, better, or more accessible care than not-for-profit institutions. While their presence has influenced not-for-profit hospitals to behave more like for-profit institutions, costs have risen inexorably while quality and access decline.  

Moreover, for-profit hospitals run by private equity (as opposed to publicly traded corporations) would likely to be even more opaque than they were when they were not-for-profit. Increasing opacity of health care would likely worsen, not improve our current problems.

Deals that turn not-for-profit hospital systems into privately held for-profit systems ought to be scrutinized ith extreme skepticism. The questions raised above about the currently proposed deals ought to be addressed, In addition, I would suggest that all such deals should be conditioned on a requirement that the taken-over hospitals, and their parent private equity companies have to disclose at least as much as both public for-profit health care corporations and not-for-profit health care organizations are required to disclose, e.g., their ownership, the make-up of their boards of directors, the compensation, in detail, of their most highly paid officers, employees, and board members, all conflicts of interest affecting their leaders, etc. By the way, maybe such disclosure should be required of all health care organizations above some reasonable minimum size. If private equity companies are unwilling to make such disclosures, maybe they should not be allowed to run health care organizations.

More Doubts About Private Equity Taking Over Not-for-Profit Hospital Systems

Last week, we posted about how buy-outs of not-for-profit hospital systems by private equity firms seemed to be a new fashion in health care.  Since then, new doubts have been raised about whether this is a good idea.

Detroit Medical Center, Vanguard Health, and the Blackstone Group

Letters to the Detroit Free Press raised concerns,

As a nonprofit corporation, DMC's mission is to provide quality health care to the community. Management is accountable to Detroit area citizens and health care consumers, not to profit-motivated investors.

As a private, for-profit corporation, its mission will be to provide profit for its shareholders. Management will be accountable to shareholders and will be rewarded in relation to the rate of return on their investments.

Also, the Free Press reported that a coalition of local not-for-profit organizations challenged the legality of the proposed sale,

The sale of the Detroit Medical Center to a for-profit Nashville company violates state law and raises issues about whether poor patients who depend on the DMC will be assured of care for years to come, three nonprofit Michigan organizations said today.

Marjorie Mitchell, executive director of Michigan Universal Health Care Network, said the organizations e-mailed today a three-page list of concerns about the sale to Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox.

Mitchell testified briefly today at the Detroit City Council about the issue and distributed the letter. The two other nonprofit organizations signing the letter were Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength, or Moses, an organization of community and religious leaders active on health issues, and Michigan Legal Services, a Detroit legal aid organization. The three groups called themselves the Coalition to Protect Detroit Health Care.

Citing a provision in state law, the letter said Michigan law is clear that nonprofit companies should not 'permit assets … to be used, conveyed or distributed for non-charitable purposes.'

'The mission of a for-profit is to serve the stockholders,' the letter to Cox said. The letter said it is the opinion of the three groups that the purchase by Vanguard of the DMC 'violates Michigan’s nonprofit corporation statute.'

The three organizations asked Cox to hold public meetings to answer questions about the impact of the proposed sale on the health of Detroiters, particularly uninsured people.

The groups also have questions about how the DMC’s $140-million charitable assets will be used as well as concerns that use of state Renaissance Zone money would benefit a for-profit company.

Caritas Christi Health Care and Cerberus Capital Management

Boston Globe news articles noted that Cerberus failed recently not only in its management of Chrysler, but of GMAC (now also bailed out by the US government), its management is secretive even for the opaque world of private equity, and it has no experience running "large medical systems." 
 
A letter by Dr Arnold Relman, distinguished former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, warned,

Cerberus promises to keep the present hospital management, add much money beyond the purchase price toward the operation and improvement of the hospitals, maintain charity support, and not sell the system — for three years. After that, who knows? Cerberus follows its own interests, and it will take money out of the community, not contribute to it.

As a close observer of the for-profit hospital industry ever since its beginnings, I predict that Cerberus will sell to another business sooner or later, and the initial promises will be forgotten. That’s what happened at Framingham’s MetroWest Hospital.

Control over the kinds of medical services provided by the hospital would be lost. Unprofitable services such as pediatrics, obstetrics, and outpatient psychiatry would disappear. Business-owned hospitals will resist major reforms to control medical costs or reorganize a community’s medical services in the public interest.

Caritas Christi ran an advertisement in local papers that referred to Cerberus as its new "financial sponsor," suggesting that the company was going to give a still not-for-profit health care system a grant, quite different from what was really proposed, which was that Cerberus would become the owner of a formerly not for-profit health care system, thus rendering it into a privately held, for-profit system.  One wonders why the public relations people thought they needed to spin the deal thus.

Finally, the Boston Globe profiled current Caritas Christi CEO Dr Ralph de la Torre, who apparently negotiated a deal that would leave him "as chief executive of Caritas, while also putting him in charge of acquiring other hospitals for Cerberus." But the article raised questions about what sort of leader he would be. It characterized him as transformed "from doctor to dealmaker," who now "stands to win a much bigger payout." Worse, it suggested that winning, as evidenced by making more money than anyone else, rather than access to quality patient care, is his prime motivation.

He used to say, ‘It’s not about the money, but that’s one way people keep score.’

In addition, Dr De la Torre has now so transformed into a CEO that "he let his medical license lapse."

Summary

Let me note some people think that the notion that how much money one makes should be considered a "score," and that he who dies with the most money wins, was one of the central reasons for the global financial collapse. For example, Nancy Rapoport suggested some New Year's resolutions for corporate boards (in 2008!), including:

I will remind myself and my colleagues that the level of CEO compensation is not an indicator of the company’s performance and that the arms race towards excessively high executive compensation is not a winnable race. At the point when money becomes just a way of keeping score, compensation is probably too high.

Earlier in 2007, Michael Kinsley wrote presciently in Time about,

a development in the larger economy. For most people, the point of money is that you can buy things with it. But at the top, where people already can buy whatever they want, the purpose of money is keeping score: making sure that you don't slip down in the Forbes 400 list.

So, putting someone who believes that he must always make more money in order to keep "winning" in charge of a large health care system does not seem to be a recipe for better patient care or more access, but rather for ever-increasing executive compensation while making money becomes the overwhelming priority for the organization, completely eclipsing such quaint concepts as quality of care, reasonable costs, or adequate access.

Recent history has not shown that for-profit hospitals deliver cheaper, better, or more accessible care than not-for-profit institutions. While their presence has influenced not-for-profit hospitals to behave more like for-profit institutions, costs have risen inexorably while quality and access decline.  

Moreover, for-profit hospitals run by private equity (as opposed to publicly traded corporations) would likely to be even more opaque than they were when they were not-for-profit. Increasing opacity of health care would likely worsen, not improve our current problems.

Deals that turn not-for-profit hospital systems into privately held for-profit systems ought to be scrutinized ith extreme skepticism. The questions raised above about the currently proposed deals ought to be addressed, In addition, I would suggest that all such deals should be conditioned on a requirement that the taken-over hospitals, and their parent private equity companies have to disclose at least as much as both public for-profit health care corporations and not-for-profit health care organizations are required to disclose, e.g., their ownership, the make-up of their boards of directors, the compensation, in detail, of their most highly paid officers, employees, and board members, all conflicts of interest affecting their leaders, etc. By the way, maybe such disclosure should be required of all health care organizations above some reasonable minimum size. If private equity companies are unwilling to make such disclosures, maybe they should not be allowed to run health care organizations.

The Health Care Reform Bill and Health Care Renewal

I have not written much about the seemingly endless health care reform debate in the US, because much of it has not been relevant to the issues we discuss on Health Care Renewal.  Now that the current phase of the debate is done, and legislation has been passed, let me offer my opinions on the few aspects that do seem relevant to this blog.

The Sunshine Act

For Health Care Renewal readers, the most important part of the legislation is that containing the provisions of the Sunshine Act, championed by Senators Grassley and Kohl.  (See this summary on Postscript, the Prescription Project blog.)  The act requires that all drug, device, biologic, and medical supply manufacturers report essentially all payments to physicians or teaching hospitals to the goverment, and on the internet.  It does not appear that the rules apply to other health care related non-profit organizations, e.g., medical schools, disease advocacy groups, health care related charities, medical societies, etc, or to payments made by for-profit health insurers, clinical research organizations, and some other corporations.  Unfortunately, the provisions only take effect in 2013.  However, despite these quibbles, this still may be one of the most important advances promoting disclosure of health care related conflicts of interest made in the 21st century.

Comparative Effectiveness Research

As best as I can tell at this point, the current legislation used the wording from the bill previously passed in the US Senate, which we discussed here and here, regarding comparative effectiveness research.  Although its goal of setting up a not-for-profit comparative effectiveness organization seems laudable, the devil will be in the details.  The Senate version gave considerable oversight of this organization to those with vested interests in selling particular products or services, threatening the impartiality of the organization and the research it would sponsor, and perhaps thus wholly defeating its ostensible purpose.  Furthermore, the Senate bill included curious wording that seems to threaten the ability of those getting funding from the organization to express views that might disturb the organization's leadership, again threatening the integrity of their dissemination of its work, and perhaps violating the First Amendment of the US Constitution.  Whether these provisions provide benefits that outweigh their harms is highly questionable.

Payments to Physicians

We have criticized how the process of setting payments to physicians by the US Medicare system has been captured by a secretive committee of the American Medical Association that is dominated by physicians who do procedures, the RBRVS Update Committee, or RUC.  The results have been payments for primary care and other cognitive services that have failed to keep up with inflation, a major cause of the continuing decline of generalist/ primary care medicine in the US.  (See most recent post here about this.)  According to the summary provided by the American College of Physicians (here), the new legislation would enable review of  payments made for specific services, and would reconsideration of the process used to set physician payments by an independent advisory group.  However, the bill would not mandate any changes in payments, or in the processes used to set them, including the pivotal role of the RUC.   So there is some chance that the legislation would lead to a more transparent, accountable, honest, and rational process for setting physician payments and hence eliminating perverse incentives, but no guarantee of such favorable changes.

Summary

The legislation seemingly will result in one major advance fostering disclosure of some conflicts of interest, and perhaps some progress in terms of reducing perverse incentives generated by Medicare's payments to physicians, and possibly reducing regulatory capture of this process.  It likely will result in more comparative effectiveness research, but how badly it will be biased in favor of vested interests is unclear.  As far as I can tell, the legislation will leave most of the other problems we discuss on Health Care Renewal untouched.  We thus have one or two small steps for mankind, but no reason for complacency.

the news is not bad, but we are still a long way from meaningfully addressing concentration and abuse of power in health care.  There will be no rest for the weary bloggers of Health Care Renewal.

Also, see comments here and here by Dr Howard Brody on the Hooked: Ethics, Medicine and Pharma blog.

ADDENDUM (25 March, 2010) - Also see comments on the Sunshine Act by Alison Bass on the Alison Bass Blog.